Given the fraught political nature of "Big Oil" and low expectations of an outcome, the agreement hammered out by the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries was quite a nifty bit of diplomatic wrangling engineered by Saudi Arabia.
It was also vital OPEC finally got its cartel act together given the fragile economic state its 14 members found themselves in.
The reality of the current "open-the-taps" policy, which has taken production to record levels and more than halved the price of oil over the past two years, was in effect a policy of mutually-assured financial destruction.
As OPEC's post meeting statement conceded, market conditions - which it played a large part in developing - are counterproductive and damaging.
"It threatens the economies of producing nations, hinders critical industry investments, jeopardizes energy security to meet growing world energy demand and challenges oil market stability as a whole," OPEC noted.
All sovereign producers endure severe budget deficits
On IMF estimates, the average breakeven point for oil to balance budgets in major producing nations is around $US100 per barrel (bbl).
In the case of strife-torn Libya and Venezuela $US200/bbl would not even do the trick, while even the fiscally most solid gulf state Qatar needs oil at around $US55/bbl to balance its books - still somewhat higher than the bounce the deal produced.
OPEC's largest producer, and key broker of the deal, Saudi Arabia is itself under the pump, so to speak.
Despite its extraordinary wealth, the Saudi regime has been cutting energy subsidies to its citizens, raising taxes and embarking on a privatisation program to stem the fiscal haemorrhaging caused by the savage price cuts and its almost 90 per cent reliance on oil sales for government revenues.
Its foreign exchange reserves have tumbled from more than $US730 billion at the end of 2014 to less than $US600 billion and it has even become a global borrower for the first time decades, issuing $US23 billion worth of bonds last month - the largest ever bond sale from an emerging market nation.
The financial stress across the oil producers is turning into social unrest, even in the relatively stable Saudi Arabia.
Nigeria and Iraq are in deep crisis, having to fight violent extremist threats with little or no money.
Venezuela is a basket-case; its currency is virtually worthless as inflation heads above 1,500 per cent and it has been kept afloat borrowing billions from China through oil-for-loan agreements.
Russia is also pretty well running on empty, its economy shrank by around 4 per cent last year and its capital reserves have declined by two-thirds as dwindling oil revenues fail to keep up with increased military spending.
Crumbling oil prices make allies out of enemies
Perhaps the best indicator of how stressed the oil dependent nations are is the level of political animosity and distrust that needed to be put to one side to strike the deal.
The key OPEC and non-OPEC brokers - Saudi Arabia and Russia - back different sides in the Syrian war, while the antipathy between Saudi Arabia and Iran runs even deeper and often spills over into war.
Then there is the not inconsequential issue of the dubious nature of deals sticking.
Russia has reneged on production cut agreements in 2001 and 2008, both deals struck during Vladimir Putin's presidency.
Russia's cut of 300,000 barrels a day (b/d) - half the non-OPEC pledge - was bigger than expected; most analysts thought a freeze at current record levels would be the extent of Mr Putin's largesse.
Saudi Arabia put its hand up for the largest cut of 600,000 b/d and even agreed to allow Iran to increase its production to 3.8 million barrels per day (mb/d), just below pre-sanction levels of 4mb/d.
Even Iraq, which had been looking to be exempt from any deal to bolster its fight against ISIS, unexpectedly accepted a 200,000 b/d cut.
Libya and Nigeria were exempted from the OPEC deal, while Indonesia suspended its membership from OPEC given it is now a net importer of oil.
A steady rather than rapid price rise if the deal holds
On Morgan Stanley figures, OPEC's 1.2mb/d cut to 32.5mb/d would bring the global market back into balance by the second half of 2017.
Adding in the full non-OPEC pledge of 600,000 b/d brings forward that estimate with the possibility of the market going into a glut clearing deficit of 1.5mb/d in the first half of next year.
It is worth noting the combined OPEC and non-OPEC pledge of 1.8mb/d represents less than 2 per cent of the current record global output of around 96mb/d.
RBC's global head of commodity strategy Helima Croft agreed the deal will help run down the "significant" global storage surplus, but will not make much of an impact until late 2017 at the earliest.
Nonetheless, Ms Croft, who was one of the first analysts to suggest a deal was not only possible but likely - mainly because of the dire financial position sovereign producers found themselves in - said the headline number was one of OPEC's most constructive moves to support prices in memory.
In a research note, Ms Croft pointed out that Saudi officials were well aware stronger prices would encourage non-OPEC producers - particularly those US shale oil fields - to start pumping again.
"A slow and steady move higher in prices ultimately wins the sustainable recovery, in our view, and we continue to see prices grinding upwards over the coming quarters rather than gapping significantly higher," Ms Croft said.
"Global oil balances remain fragile, caught in a push-pull situation where the global rebalancing act repeatedly proves it is indeed a lengthy process, while the elasticity of US shale has proven itself a quicker process."
In other words, a sharp move higher in prices could inadvertently resurrect price-sensitive non-OPEC production and it would be back to square one.
RBC's forecast is for the oil price to average in the low $US50s in the first half of 2017 before inching into the low $US60/bbl range late next year.
There are still a fair few issues to be hammered out, such as how would the cartel respond to breaches by non-OPEC members. Further details on that are expected next week.
The agreement runs for six months, with an extension option of another six months, and is likely to hold as long as the Saudis remain committed to it.
"The opportunities for cheating are somewhat reduced by the fact that the most likely unfaithful suspects are either already exempted or already seeing their production trending downwards due to internal problems," Ms Croft noted.
The fact individual country production levels were set out and a Ministerial Monitoring Committee established to enforce the agreement gives this deal a degree of accountability and credibility earlier efforts have lacked.
If nothing else, it supports the idea the idea OPEC may be back in business - if not as a price fixing cartel, then perhaps as a price influencing one.
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